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COMMENTS

Wilkins v. Bentley:* Getting Out the Student Vote
in Michigan
I.

INTRODUCTION

The right to vote is one of the most precious constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court has described it as preservative of all rights,1 a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society,2 and a bedrock
of our political system.3 Justice Black once stated, "No right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election
of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live."4 It supports not only the individual's personal interest in selfgovernment, but also the collective societal interest in broadly based
consensual representation. The magnitude of these interests suggests
a strong policy favoring extension of the franchise with as few
limitations as possible.
On the other hand, conditions on suffrage may further legitimate
state interests that include promoting intelligent use of the ballot,11
identifying the voter and preventing voting fraud, 6 and assuring the
voter's membership and interest in the community.7 These interests
suggest a competing policy favoring some conditions on suffrage in
order to safeguard and effectuate the electoral process. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the states "have long been held to have
broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of
suffrage may be exercised." 8 However, it is equally clear that conditions imposed by the states on suffrage must be consistent with all
limitations on governmental power imposed by the Constitution.0
The constitutionality of voting qualifications is an issue brought
sharply into focus by the current controversy regarding state residency requirements for student voters.10 Students face a serious
• 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971).
I. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
2. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561·62 (1964).
3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
4. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
5. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County 13d. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959),
6. See, e.g., Hall v. l3eals, 292 F. Supp. 610, 614 (D. Colo. 1968); Sola v. Sanchez
Vilella, 270 F. Supp. 459, 464 (D.P.R. 1967), afjd., 390 F.2d 160 (1st Cir. 1968); Drueding
v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721, 724 (D. Md. 1964), afjd. per curiam, 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
7. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
8. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959). Accord,
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 633 (1903); Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 335 (1900).
9. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (equal protection and
due process); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1964) (equal protection); Jolicoeur v.
Mihaly, 5 Cal. 3d 565,488 P.2d 1, 96 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1971) (twenty-sixth amendment).
IO. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 168.ll(b) (1967), set out in note 17 infra, See
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problem because state residency statutes often contain special requirements that effectively bar them from voing in local elections.11 This
problem has only been intensified since the twenty-sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution lowered the minimum voting age
to eighteen, thereby significantly increasing the number of potential
student voters.
The frustrations, fears, and tensions surrounding these statutes
are aptly illustrated by recent reports in newspapers and magazines
across the country. A classic statement of the problem comes from
an Illinois state representative: "For goodness sakes, we could have
these transients actually controlling the elections, voting city councils
and mayors in or out of offi.ce."12 A related fear is expressed by the
New Hampshire Attorney General: "They [students] float a bond
issue and then move on, and who's left holding the bag?" 18 On the
other hand, advocates of student registration contend that since
students pay local taxes and are subject to authority of local government they should also have a hand in the city's administration.14 The
courts are presently re-examining the issue of student participation
in local elections. The early returns are in the students' favor.15
II.

THE WILKINS DECISION

In Wilkins v. Bentley the Michigan supreme court considered a
challenge to the state's residency requirement for students.17 The
16

generally Singer, Student Power at the Polls, 31 Omo ST. L.J. 703, 721-23 (1970).
Statutes defining residence are to be distinguished ftom statutes setting forth durational
residence requirements (i.e., those which prescribe the length of time a citizen must
reside in a particular locality). See Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. March
21, 1972). See generally Macleod &: Wilberding, State Voting Residency Requirements
and Civil Rights, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 93 (1969); Comment, Constitutional LawElections-Durational Residency Requirement, 23 S. CAR. L. REv. 320 (1971).
11. See Comment, Student Voting Rights in University Communities, 6 HARv. CIV.
RIGHTS·CIV. Lm. L. REv. 397 (1971); Note, Restrictions on Student Voting: An Unconstitutional Anachronism?, 4 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 215 (1970).
12. Otten, Should Collegians Vote at Home or at School?, Wall St. J., April 15,
1971, at 1, col. 6 (statement by m. State Rep. Robert Michel).
13. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1971, at 27 (statement by N.H. Attorney General Warren
Rudman).
14. Michigan Daily, Sept. 9, 1971, at 3, col. 6.
15. Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. KY. 1971), Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich.
670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971).
16. 385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971).
17. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 168.11 (1967) (emphasis added), provides:
(a) The term "residence," as used in this act, for registration and voting
purposes shall be construed to mean that place at which a person habitually sleeps,
keeps his or her personal effects and has a regular place of lodging. Should a person
have more than 1 residence, or should a wife have a residence separate ftom that
of the husband, that place at which such person resides the greater part of the
time shall be his or her official residence •••• This section shall not be construed
to affect existing judicial interpretation of the term residence.
(b) No elector shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of
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plaintiff-students maintained their regular place of lodging in Ann
Arbor and satisfied the general residency requirements applicable to
other citizens.18 The students, however, were denied the right to
register and vote in Ann Arbor under a special section of the state
residency statute that provides: "No elector shall be deemed to have
gained or lost a residence . . . while a student at any institution of
learning." 19 This provision had long been held to mean that the
student must overcome a rebuttable presumption that he is not a
resident in the locale of the institution of learning.20 It would seem
that the presumption could be rebutted by some showing of an
intention to remain in the locale,21 although it was established that
a mere declaration of intention by the student would not suffice to
establish residence. 22 The Michigan decisions failed to indicate precisely what factors would rebut the presumption.23 Against this
background the Michigan supreme court held that the student residency provision violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Federal Constitution.24
his being employed in the service of the United States or of this state, nor while
engaged in the navigation of the waters of this state or of the United States or
of the high seas, nor while a student at any institution of learning, nor while kept
at any almshouse or other asylum at public expense, nor while confined in any
public prison. Honorably discharged members of the armed forces of the United
States or of this state and who reside in the veterans' facility established by this
state may acquire a residence where the facility is located.
(c) No member of the armed forces of the United States shall be deemed a
resident of this state in consequence of being stationed in any military or naval
place within the state.
18. MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 168.U(a) (1967), set out in note 17 supra.
19. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 168.ll(b) (1967), set out in note 17 supra.
20. Attorney General ex rel. Miller v. Miller, 266 Mich. 127, 253 N.W. 241 (1934):
People v. Osborn, 170 Mich. 143, 135 N.W. 921 (1912); Wolcott v. Holcomb, 97 Mich. 361,
56 N.W. 837 (1893).
21. See Note, supra note 11, at 216-21 (detailed history and analysis of Michigan
law-a presumption against student voting). See also Comment, supra note 11, at 406·
09 (students as residents); Note, Student Vating and Apportionment: The "Rotten
Boroughs" of Academia, 81 YALE L.J. 35, 39-42 (1971) (case law of student voting and
residence).
22. People v. Osborne, 170 Mich. 143, 148, 135 N.W. 921, 923 (1912),
23. Factors which various state courts have considered to be relevant include the
following: a student's gainful employment in the college community, home ownership with no present intention of pulling up stakes, apartment dwelling as head
of family, holding a teaching and research assistantship, stated intention to make
the university town a home upon graduation, year-round residence, financial
independence from parents, and payment of local property and income ta.xes.
Note, supra note II, at 220 (footnotes omitted). See generally Singer, supra note 10, at
721-23; Comment, supra note 11, at 404-06, 408-09; Note, Election Laws as Legal Roadblocks to Voting, 55 IOWA L. REV. 616 (1970); Note, supra note 11, at 239-43 (Appendix
of student voter questionnaires used in different Michigan cities).
24. 385 Mich. at 678, 694, 189 N.W.2d at 426-27, 434. The court also found
corresponding violations of the Michigan Constitution. 385 Mich. at 679, 694, 189
N.W.2d at 427, 434.
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III. Dm: PROCESS
The starting point for the court's due process analysis was the
statement that the right to vote is "a fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights," 25 and that "courts have closely
scrutinized any law that interferes with fundamental rights to insure
that they are not unduly vague or give local officials unfettered discretion."26 The court noted that in cases involving voter registration,
the Supreme Court has struck down such state laws. 21 Substantial
reliance was placed upon the language of Justice Black in Louisiana
v. United States: 28 " 'The cherished right of people in a country like
ours to vote cannot be obliterated by the use of laws like this, which
leave the voting fate of a citizen to the passing whim or impulse of
an individual registrar.' " 29 The court found common ground between the problems faced by students in the instant case and those
faced by blacks in Louisiana:
Although the voter qualification tests involved [in Louisiana]
were used to disfranchise blacks, thus bringing into play the :fifteenth
as well as the fourteenth amendment, the inherent vagueness of the
interpretation test and the imprecise criteria used by the registrars
presented prospective black voters with a dilemma analogous to that
faced today by students."30
Having established the legal principle against discretion in the
voter registration context, the court proceeded to find that Michigan
registrars were in fact allowed unfettered discretion under the student voter registration provision:
"[I]n Michigan ... the standards which students must meet in order
to vote in the locality in which their college is located are extremely
vague. . . . [T]hus each registration clerk determines himself which
factors will overcome the presumption against student registrability
in his city." 31
The court found that "[t]he record in this case amply supports this
assertion." 32 In addition it noted a concession made by the Ann
25. 385 Mich. at 676, 189 N.W.2d at 425, quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886).
26. 385 Mich. at 676, 189 N.W.2d at 425. As authority for this proposition the court
cited Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), a case that dealt with a prior restraint on
free speech.
27. 385 Mich. at 676, 189 N.W.2d at 425.
28. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
29. 385 Mich. at 677, 189 N.W.2d at 425-26, quoting 380 U.S. at 153.
30. 385 Mich. at 677, 189 N.W.2d at 426, quoting Note, supra note 11, at 221.
31. 385 Mich. at 677-78, 189 N.W.2d at 426, quoting Note, supra note 11, at 220.
32. 385 Mich. at 678, 189 N.W.2d at 426.
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Arbor city attorney that "while Ann Arbor uses an elaborate questionnaire before allowing students to register, the city clerk of Detroit
(where . . . several colleges are located) does not ask any special
questions of student registrants."88 Thus, the court held that the
student residency provision was overbroad and granted a constitutionally prohibited discretion to local clerks in Michigan.84
The nature of the discretion held unconstitutional is not clear.
If Wilkins is limited to its facts, the critical element of discretion
may be the lack of any judicial or legislative standards or criteria,
and the resulting range of questions asked by clerks in different
areas. Assuming this discretionary element was cured by judicial
construction or legislative enactment of standards establishing uniform state-wide questioning, it could be argued that an impermissible
degree of discretion still inheres in the necessity for clerks to weigh
the various criteria, deciding which factors might overcome the presumption against student residence. On the other hand, as long as
subjective intent is relevant to students' residency, the administrative
need for flexibility and decisions at a local level suggests that this
kind of discretion-the weighing of uniform criteria-might be permissible. Thus, under a narrow reading of Wilkins, whether uniform
state-·wide questioning would satisfy due process requirements remains an open question. While some of the court's language may be
read to condemn discretionary factor-weighing in and of itself, the
court's suggestion, in dicta, that but for equal protection considerations the due process violation might have been cured by judicial
construction85 may support the constitutional sufficiency of uniform
statewide questions.
Assuming that uniform questioning would withstand due process
problems, an additional problem arises. While it was not necessary to
the due process holding on discretion, the Michigan supreme court
summarily considered the nature of questions that registrars asked
students in determining residence. The court stated:
At the trial, the plaintiffs were asked questions concerning bank
accounts; where they obtained their support; whether they owned or
leased property, and where they spent their vacations. However, these
33. 385 Mich. at 678, 189 N.W.2d at 426. For a comparison of various questionnaires
used by city clerks for student registration, see Note, supra note 11, at 239•43 (Appendix).
34. 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W.2d at 427. The court added that "[t]he ability to
exercise the precious right to vote cannot depend on whether a student attends school
in a large city or a smaller town." 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W.2d at 427, citing
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). It is interesting that this possible equal protection
consideration arises as a direct consequence of unfettered discretion, a due process
consideration.
35. 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W.2d at 427. See notes 109-12 infra and accompanying
text.
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questions concerning wealth, property ownership, and travel, if used
as criteria to establish residence for voting purposes are constitutionally impermissible.a6
In making this broad assertion the court relied upon Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,87 Kramer v. Union Free School District,88
and Shapiro v. Thompson,89 within which cases classifications based
respectively upon wealth, property ownership, and travel were struck
down.
There are ttvo difficulties with the court's interpretation of these
cases. First, questions used as criteria to determine a fact (such as
intent regarding residence) are not classifications per se. The term
"classification," as related to equal protection considerations, has
traditionally meant the "legislative classification" of the persons to
whom the law applies. "This sense of 'classify' ... must be distinguished from the sense in which 'to classify' refers to the act of
determining whether an individual is a member of a particular
class."40 However, a showing of a one-to-one correlation between the
answer to a question and the decision to register the student could
arguably support a finding of classification. Even assuming such questions to be classifications they would not be invalid per se. The state
would have the opportunity to demonstrate compelling interests.41
Thus the court's suggestion that questions regarding bank accounts,
home ownership, and vacation travel are constitutionally impermissible as criteria to establish residence should be viewed with extreme
caution. Nevertheless, this problem is independent of the holding
that the Michigan student residency provision violated due process
since it granted, at least in the absence of uniform state standards,
a constitutionally prohibited discretion to local clerks in Michigan.

A.

The Scope of Louisiana v. United States

The language relied on from Louisiana seems strikingly susceptible of application to the facts of Wilkins, as the voting fate of students was indeed being left to "the passing whim or impulse of an
individual registrar."42 If, however, the principle is applied that the
language of a decision must be construed in light of its constitu36. 385 Mich. at 678, 189 N.W. 2d at 426 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
Concerning wealth as a classification, see note 119 infra.
37. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
38. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
39. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
40. Tussman &: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341,
344 (1949).
41. See text accompanying notes 167-89 supra.
42, See text aa;ompanying note 29 supra,
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tionally significant facts, the Wilkins result does not flow automatically from Louisiana. Indeed, it may represent a significant extension
of prior case law. The thesis of this section is that the Wilkins due
process holding, nevertheless, rests firmly upon constitutional principles, reason, and policy, and is a fulfillment of the doctrinal promise, made in Louisiana, to safeguard voter registration from unfettered discretion of local officials.
Critics of the Wilkins decision might contend that Louisiana
should be read narrowly in light of the facts ·of that case. At issue in
Louisiana was an "interpretation test," under which a voter registration applicant was required to "understand" and "give a reasonable
interpretation" of any section of the state or federal constitution
"when read to him by the registrar."43 This discretionary registration
process differed in several ways from the discretion held unconstitutional in Wilkins. First, the Court in Louisiana stressed that the
interpretation test "was part of a successful plan to deprive Louisiana
Negroes of their right to vote."44 Thus, the discretion which was held
unconstitutional in Louisiana might be viewed not as a constitutionally impermissible evil in and of itself, but rather as an element
of an over-all plan to disenfranchise blacks. It could be contended
that this discriminatory plan was essential to the Louisiana holding.
Weight is given to this argument by the alternative holdings in
Louisiana that the interpretation test not only violated fourteenth
amendment due process and equal protection,46 but also violated the
fifteenth amendment on the ground that the interpretation test
"specifically conflicted with prohibitions against discriminations in
voting because of race."46 In Schnell v. Davis,47 mentioned by the
Court in Louisiana as being "squarely in point,"48 discretion in a
voter registration context similar to that in Louisiana was held to
violate the equal protection clause and the fifteenth amendment,
with no mention being made of due process. Furthermore, while
Louisiana has been relied upon in a successful attack on discretion
in a jury selection process,49 it has usually been cited only as authority
43. 380 U.S. at 149.
44. 380 U.S. at 151.
45. The express language of the Court was: "[W]e • • • affirm here the District
Court's holding that the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution and statutes which
require voters to satisfy registrars of their ability to 'understand and give a reasonable
interpretation of any section' of the Federal or Louisiana Constitution violate the
Constitution." 380 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added). The district court expressly found
violations of both due process and equal protection. 225 F. Supp. 353, 391 (E,D. La.
1963).
46. 380 U.S. at 153.
47. 336 U.S. 933, a/Jg. per curiam 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949).
48. 380 U.S. at 153.
49. Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 51 n.34 (5th Cir. 1966). Sec also
Chestnut v. New York, 370 F.2d 1, 7 n.13 (2d Cir. 1966) (dictum). But see Carter v.
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for equal protection or fifteenth amendment decisions. 60
A second distinction is that in Louisiana the Court stressed both
the history of discrimination against blacks61 and the striking evidence that discrimination resulted from the registrar's unfettered
discretion:
As the evidence showed, colored people, even some with the most

advanced education and scholarship, were declared by voting registrars with less education to have an unsatisfactory understanding of
the Constitution of Louisiana or of the United States.62
Comparable evidence of blatant abuse of discretion was not presented
in Wilkins. 63 Moreover, it could be argued that a court should scrutinize discretion more vigorously to protect blacks than to protect
students, and that the analogy between blacks and students as facing
many of the same problems is overstated.
While these distinctions carry some weight, their significance
should not be exaggerated to the point that sight of the obvious is
lost. When viewed as a whole, the thrust of the Louisiana decision
is well represented by the language of Justice Black relied upon by
the Wilkins court. Above all else, the Court in Louisiana repeatedly
stressed the elements of unfettered discretion. 64 Citing United States
v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,65 a traditional due process vagueness case,
it stated that "[m]any of our cases have pointed out the invalidity of
laws so completely devoid of standards and restraints." 66 Moreover,
Jury Commn., 396 U.S. 320 (1970). Cf. People v. Ferguson, 55 l\fisc. 2d 711, 713, 286
N.Y.S.2d 976, 980 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
Louisiana has also been cited in dicta in several cases for its antidiscretion principles.
See Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259, 1262 n.4 (7th Cir. 1970); Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d
223,228 n.7, 466 P.2d 244,247 n.7, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23 n.7 (1970).
50. E.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966); Haney v. Country Bd. of
~m~~-~~~~~~~~~~~m~

Cir. 1965).
51. See 380 U.S. at 147-50. See generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 309 (1966).
For cases involving attacks on continuing discriminatory practices in Louisiana
after Louisiana, see United States v. Palmer, 356 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Lucky, 239 F. Supp. 233 (W.D.
La. 1965); Lampkin v. Connor, 239 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1965); Davis v. Gallinghouse,
246 F. Supp. 208 (E.D. La. 1965); United States v. Original Knights of Ku Klux Klan,
250 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1965).
52. 380 U.S. at 153.
53. The city clerk estimated that "between 85 and 90 per cent of those students
seeking to register are permitted to do so." Brief for Appellee at 3, Wilkins v. Bentley,
385 Mich. 670, 189 N.W.2d 423 (1971).
54. E.g., "no definite and objective standards," "no effective method whereby
arbitrary and capricious action by registrars • • • may be prevented or redressed,"
"official's uncontrolled power." 380 U.S. at 152, 153.
55. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
56. 380 U.S. at 153.
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the alternative holdings in Louisiana do not detract from the mandate against vagueness in the voter registration context, for it is
normal judicial practice to develop new doctrinal applications while
holding alternatively on well-established grounds. 67 It also appears
that in light of the commonly accepted rationale for striking down
vague statutes-the lack of fair warning to the individual subject to
the statute and the inadequate guidance to the trier of factli 8-evidence of actual discrimination is not necessary to a due process violation. Finally, while analogy between blacks and students may be
weak, the proper focus should be on the nature of the voting registration process, and not upon the identity of the applicants for registration. In other words, it is solicitude for protection of the right to
vote that should compel application of the vagueness doctrine, and
not solicitude for blacks or for students.69 In summary, it is submitted that Louisiana does rest primarily on a due process right
against vagueness and unfettered discretionary procedures in voter
registration.
B.

The Critical Elements: Discretion and Voting

Louisiana, by its own weight, should compel the decision in
Wilkins that the student residency provision violates the due process
clause. If, however, any doubt exists as to the scope of Louisiana in
due process cases, it is useful to consider tw'O ancillary questions.
First, is the decision consistent ·with the range of established constitutional principles against discretion and the rationales underlying
these principles? Second, does special significance attach by reason
of the voter registration context? It is suggested that the answers to
these questions strongly support the Wilkins due process result.
I. The Established Principles Against Discretion

a. Statutes void for vagueness. Some cases related to Wilkins have
been decided under the long established void-for-vagueness doctrine.60 In these decisions the Court scrutinized state and federal
statutes to resolve whether their "words and phrases are so vague
and indefinite that any penalty prescribed for their violation consti57. Although the vagueness doctrine was well established prior to Louisiana, the
Supreme Court had never applied it to voter registration. See generally Amsterdam,
The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
58. This rationale has often been noted by courts and commentators. See, e.g.,
Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939);
Amsterdam, supra note 57, at 68 n.3; Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties,
4 VAND. L. REv. 533, 541 (1951).

59. See text accompanying notes 89-108 infra.
60. For a thorough collection of such cases and discussion of the vagueness doctrine,
see Amsterdam, supra note 57.

April 1972]

Comments

929

tutes a denial of due process of Iaw."61 Wilkins differs from traditional vagueness cases because the traditional cases involve scrutiny
of penal statutes,62 while the statute in issue in Wilkins was one that
placed residency qualifications on the right to vote. However, examination of the policies underlying traditional vagueness cases
suggests that this distinction should not compel a different result.
As previously noted, the rationale behind the void-for-vagueness
doctrine rests upon ttvo requirements of due process: fair notice to
the individual who is subject to the statute, and adequate guidance to
the trier of fact.63 As to the first, fundamental fairness clearly requires
adequate notice of acts that will result in a criminal penalty.64 It is
submitted that fundamental fairness also requires fair notice of
affirmative acts that are required as a condition precedent to the
exercise of a fundamental right. For example, some students might
have been unable to establish residence in Ann Arbor because of a
lack of notice of what acts were acceptable to the registrars as evidence of bona fide residence. For those students the loss of voting
rights may be characterized as substantially similar to a "penalty"
that is not preceded by fair warning.65
Does the "guidance for the trier of fact" rationale apply strongly
to Wilkins? In a narrow sense, registrars are not "triers of fact" if
that term is to be limited to the trial situation. Voting registrars, however, if administering a rebuttable presumption against students'
residence, must make factual determinations in the sensitive context
of voting rights. Judges are trained to reason impartially, and juries
may be said to represent the voice of the community; 66 yet the law
61. Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commn., 286 U.S. 210, 243 (1932).
"Although it is usual to conceive of the void-for-vagueness cases as cases in which
the Supreme Court passes upon the 'face' validity of statutes, in fact what the Court
is far more frequently reviewing is a state court's reading of the challenged statute."
Amsterdam, supra note 57, at 68 n.4 (citations omitted). Thus in Wilkins the court
found no vagueness in the literal terms of MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 168.ll(b) (1967), set
out in note 17 supra. Rather, vagueness principles were applied to the statute as it
had been construed by the Michigan courts "to mean that a student must overcome
a rebuttable presumption that he is not a resident in the locale of the institution of
learning." 385 Mich. at 675, 189 N.W.2d at 425.
62. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (statute proscribing sale of
obscene literature); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921) (statute
proscribing unreasonable charges in handling necessaries).
63. See authorities cited in note 58 supra.
64. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
65. Application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is not limited to cases involving
a "penalty" created by a penal statute. See Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966)
(civil statute permitting jurors to determine whether an acquitted defendant must
pay costs held void for vagueness in absence of any standards preventing arbitrary
imposition of costs). It is, of course, possible that even if given notice of the factors
considered by the registrars, students would not change their activities.
66. See, e.g., Sioux City 8e P.R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873). But cf. J. FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 180-81 (1930).
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requires standards to guard against discretionary decision by these
presumably impartial triers of fact. 67 Similarly, legal standards should
be imposed to guard against vesting discretion in voting registrars,
who by virtue of their politically oriented office may be more prone
to arbitrary action than a judge or jury.
b. "Overbroad" statutes. Some related cases involving "overbroad" statutes have used nvo additional grounds to support a finding
of unconstitutionality: (I) the potential danger of discriminatory enforcement, and (2) the resulting chilling effect of such a statute on
constitutionally protected activity.68 Do these rationales apply with
force to Wilkins?
The "potential discriminatory enforcement" and "chilling effect"
rationales are illustrated by NAACP v. Button.69 At issue was the
constitutionality of a statute that banned solicitation of certain legal
business, including that of being an agent "for any ... organization
or association which employs, retains, or compensates any attorney at
law in connection with any judicial proceeding . . . in which it has
no pecuniary right or liability." 70 The state court had held that the
activities of the NAACP legal staff constituted solicitation of legal
business.71 However, the Supreme Court found that the statute
violated first amendment freedoms:
It is enough that a vague and broad statute lends itself to selective enforcement against unpopular causes. We cannot close our eyes to the
fact that the militant Negro civil rights movement has engendered
the intense resentment and opposition of the politically dominant
white community of Virginia • . . In such circumstances, a statute
broadly curtailing group activity leading to litigation may easily become a weapon of oppression, however even handed its terms appear.
Its mere existence could well freeze out of existence all such activity
on behalf of the civil rights of Negro citizens.72
67. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435-36 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940). Cf. Niemetko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1961).
The Thornhill case contains the classic statement of the overbreadth doctrine:
[The penal statute in question here] does not aim specifically at evils within
the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit
other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of
speech or of the press. The existence of such a statute, which readily lends itself
to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure, results in a continuous and
pervasive restraint on all freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded
as within its purview.
310 U.S. at 97-98. The problem of the overbroad statute has been described as "a
special case of the problem of vagueness." Freund, supra note 58, at 540.
69. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
70. 371 U.S. at 423 n.7.
71. 371 U.S. at 424-26, 426 n.9. Prominent among the activities of the legal staff
was "to explain to a meeting of parents and children the legal steps necessary to
achieve desegregation." 371 U.S. at 421.
72, 371 U.S. at 435-36 (emphasis added).
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The "chilling effect" rationale does not apply with great strength
in the Wilkins context. While vague standards may create some disincentive to student attempts to register, it is unclear whether they
will operate as a significant deterrent. Students have only their time
to lose, and do not face the threat of criminal sanction.
The "discriminatory enforcement" rationale, however, is strikingly applicable to Wilkins. This rationale has been stressed in contexts not involving racial tensions73 and in light of the strong opposition to student registration often expressed by some members of
the community,74 there exists a real danger that a registrar might
intentionally discriminate against students. This danger may be further illustrated by Cox v. Louisiana.75 At issue in Cox was a statute
providing criminal sanction for breach of peace that the Supreme
Court held unconstitutionally overbroad.76 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Black stated:
Such a statute does not provide for government by clearly defined
laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-moment opinions
of a policeman on his beat .... This kind of statute provides a perfect device to arrest people whose views do not suit the policeman or
his superiors, while leaving free to talk anyone ·with whose views the
police agree.77
Similarly, the ability to register and vote should be a function of
"clearly defined laws" rather than the "passing whim or impulse of
an individual registrar." 78
c. Prior restraint cases. Another group of cases that may be compared profitably to Wilkins are those in which statutes have been
held unconstitutional under the first amendment as prior restraints
devoid of standards. In these cases the Court has proclaimed that the
Constitution does not allow administrative officials unfettered discretionary control over the fundamental rights of freedom of speech
and religion. 79
As an illustration, in Kunz v. New York, 80 the Court considered
a statute that required a permit as a condition precedent to conducting religious services in public places; it held that "New York cannot
73. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (statute proscribing
"loitering" and "picketing" as applied to labor disputes).
74. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
75. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
76. 379 U.S. at 552.
77. 379 U.S. at 579. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886).
78. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965). See also text accompanying
notes 29-33 supra.
79. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 553-58 (1965); Kunz v. New· York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saii v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
80. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
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vest restraining control over the right to speak on religious subjects
in an administrative official where there are no appropriate standards
to guide his action."81 Similarly, in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,82 the Court struck down a statute requiring permits for parades
or public demonstrations, stating that "a law subjecting the exercise
of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing
authority, is unconstitutional." 83
In Wilkins, there were no "appropriate" or "narrow, objective,
and definite standards" to guide the individual registrars,84 yet in a
rough sense these registrars were broadly empowered to administer
prior restraints on the right to vote. Wilkins differs from Kunz and
Shuttlesworth only in that the latter cases involved discretionary
prior restraints upon first amendment rights, whereas Wilkins dealt
with a discretionary restraint on the right to vote. The potential
danger of unfettered administrative power stifling fundamental
rights seems clear in either case. If one accepts the proposition that
the right to vote deserves judicial protections as stringent as those
afforded freedom of speech and religion, then the Court's mandate
against unfettered discretion should apply in the Wilkins voter registration context. This proposition is commended by the Court's solicitude for the right to vote in equal protection settings.80
Moreover, it may be contended that voting rights are even more
in need of protection against unfettered discretion than are those
of freedom of speech and religion. First, one may assume that many
persons whose freedoms of speech or religion are infringed will
vigorously fight for their rights and may even ignore a restraining
statute, proceeding to demonstrate or speak at the risk of imprisonment if courts do not find the statute unconstitutional. 86 On the
other hand, the voter applicant may not be as committed to protecting his rights, because the individual who is refused registration
and voting rights may not feel that his personal interests are seriously
threatened. Therefore, the burden of safeguarding the interest in a
fair and democratic voting process falls heavily upon the courts,87 re81. 340 U.S. at 295. On the other hand the Court has specifically illustrated the
nature of a "limited discretion" that is constitutionally permissible if "exercised with
'uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts of each application, free from
improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination' • • • [and
with] a 'systematic, consistent and just order of treatment' ••••" Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941), quoting Cox v. New Hampshire, 91 N.H. 137, 143,
16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940). See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
82. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
83. 394 U.S. at 150-51.
84. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
85. See text accompanying notes 126-36 infra.
86. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
87. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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quiring a strict standard of review over administrative discretion
when voting registration procedures are at issue.
Second, many individuals whose freedom of speech is infringed
by a restraining statute may be able to find alternative, legally permissible, methods of communicating their ideas.88 On the other hand,
while voter applicants who are refused registration might still participate indirectly in local election processes-for example, through
alternatives such as campaign activities and voter drives-these persons suffer an absolute loss of their right to the direct participation
in self-government in the college community. Finally, those individuals whose speech is infringed may use the vote to induce legislative change that would enable them to express their views more
satisfactorily, whereas voter applicants who have been refused registration are left with significantly less leverage in the legislative
process.

2. The Significance of the Voting Context
The preceding section analyzed the general treatment of "discretion" and demonstrated that Wilkins is consistent with a wide
range of settled case law. It is useful to consider next what special
significance should attach because Wilkins involved the voter registration context.
It has been suggested by Professor Amsterdam that the void-forvagueness doctrine "has been used by the Supreme Court almost
invariably ... [as a] buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms." 89 In support of this
thesis Professor Amsterdam pointed to the initial use of the vagueness doctrine in the business regulation context during the era in
which the Court gave strong protection to property and contract
rights, and its later use as a buffer for first amendment freedoms. 90
Significantly, Professor Amsterdam's article was written in 1960,
prior to Reynolds v. Sims91 and the host of cases92 establishing voting
rights as those perhaps most highly protected by the Court. The
logical extension of his thesis is that the void-for-vagueness doctrine
should be used by the Court to establish "buffer zone" protection
against discretion in the voting rights area. In retrospect, Louisiana
may be viewed as the genesis and Wilkins as a strong endorsement
of such "buffer zone" protection for voting rights.
88, For a full discussion of the problem of reasonable alternatives, see Blasi, Prior
Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1481, 1497-1501 (1970).
89. Amsterdam, supra note 57, at 75.
90. Id. at 84-85. Cf. Freund, supra note 58, at 540.
91. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
92, E.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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A second reason for requiring strict review of vagueness and
discretion in the voter registration context is suggested by decisions
under the equal protection clause. When a voting right is infringed,
the Court has adopted, in lieu of traditional equal protection standards, the "strict scrutiny" of the "compelling state interest" test. 03
Voting rights should also command stringent review against vagueness and discretion.
In light of these reasons for protecting voting rights with the
vagueness doctrine, it is useful to examine Carter v. Jury Commission,94 the only case in which the Supreme Court squarely considered
application of the Louisiana holding on vagueness, and one that
might seem to preclude application of Louisiana to the Wilkins case.
In Carter, the Court refused to apply Louisiana to an attack on vague
statutory standards concerning jury selection, holding that the statute
"requiring the jury commissioners to select for jury service those
persons who are 'generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and
. . . esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character
and sound judgment'" was not unconstitutional on its face. 0u In
refusing to apply Louisiana, the Court stressed that there was "no
suggestion that the law was originally adopted or subsequently carried forward for the purpose of fostering racial discrimination. " 00
The treatment of Louisiana in Carter might suggest that the Louisiana principle invalidating a statute governing voter registration for
lack of standards will not apply absent a finding of discriminatory
purpose or application. But several factual distinctions between Louisiana and Carter indicate that this conclusion is not justified.
First, Carter involved jury rights97 and the Court might well have
made a less stringent review of vagueness than it would have in a
voting rights case.98 Thus Carter may suggest only that in the context
of attacks on jury exclusion the Court ·will look not only for vagueness and discretion, but also for discriminatory purpose as prerequisites to holding a statute void on its face. But if one accepts the
notion that the vagueness doctrine should provide a "buffer zone"
for voting rights, then Carter is not inconsistent with the application
of Louisiana principles against discretion in the voter registration
93. See text accompanying notes 126-36 infra.
94. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
95. 396 U.S. at 331.
96. 396 U.S. at 336.
97. The essence of the constitutional attack in Carter was that qualified blacks were
being systematically excluded from Greene County, Alabama, grand and petit juries, 396
U.S. at 321-30.
98. The suggestion that voting rights deserve greater protection than jury rights
finds support in the Court's characterization of voting rights as "preservative of all
rights," Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886), and "of the essence in a
democratic society," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 535 (1964),
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context even absent an allegation or finding of discriminatory purpose. Moreover, this construction of Carter is consistent with a recognition that judicial review of legislative motive is disfavored,99 and
that the focus should be upon the nature of the infringed right.
A second factual distinction between Carter and the Louisiana or
Wilkins cases centers around the quantitative degree of vagueness in
the statutes at issue. While in Carter the words in the statute were
susceptible of varying meaning, it is arguable that the exercise of
discretion by jury commissioners was not as totally unfettered as that
present in Louisiana or Wilkins. The statute in Carter at least purported to set forth standards for decision: the commissioners could
exercise discretion within the ambit of meaning attributable to words
such as "honest" and "intelligent,"100 but they could not use any
standards whatsoever for jury selection. In contrast, in Louisiana a
wider latitude arguably existed in defining what would constitute
a "reasonable interpretation" of the Constitution,101 and in Wilkins
there were no state-wide standards regarding what evidence might
rebut the presumption against a student's residence.102 Moreover, in
a factual setting where jury commissioners exercised "unfettered
discretion," by choosing jurors on the basis of subjective standards
not included in the federal statutory scheme, one court relied on
Louisiana, absent evidence of discriminatory purpose, in holding that
violation of the statutory plan required reversal of convictions by
improperly drawn juries.103 Thus, if the jury commissioners in Carter
had been vested with a higher degree of discretion, it is possible that
the Court might have applied Louisiana without evidence of discriminatory purpose, even in the jury selection context.
A third reason for requiring registrars to make decisions in accordance with uniform and specific standards is that the evils of
discretionary denials of voting rights are magnified when there is
no method by which a voter applicant can obtain adequate judicial
review of a registrar's decision. This problem was considered by the
district court in Louisiana.104' That court stated:
The State does not deny that unlimited discretion is vested in the
registrars by the laws of Louisiana, but argues that officials must act
reasonably and that their decisions are subject to review by district
courts. Louisiana, however, provides no effective method whereby
99. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949). But see
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (egregious legislative gerrymander suggested
that legislation was solely concerned with fencing Negro citizens out of town so as
to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote).
100. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
101. See 380 U.S. at 148.
102. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
103. Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966).
104. 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963). See text accompanying notes 42-59 supra.
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arbitrary and capricious action by registrars of voters may be prevented or redressed. Unreviewable discretion was built in the test.10r;
Uniform standards guiding registrars' decisions are necessary to facilitate judicial review, and this minimum requirement supports the
Wilkins decision.
In addition to uniform standards, it might be contended that even
greater procedural protection should be afforded the voting process.
It has been held that procedural safeguards to facilitate an expeditious review of film censorship are required by the Constitution.100
Moreover, there is emerging doctrinal authority for expeditious review procedures in other first amendment contexts.107 As Justice
Harlan has stated, "[7]iming is of the essence in politics. ... [W]hen
an event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard
promptly, if it is to be considered at all."108 Similarly, time is of the
essence in voting since once an election has been held, no judicial
decision can restore the right to participate in the past event. Expeditious review procedures are necessary to safeguard voting rights.
C.

Conclusion

The Louisiana decision should govern the invalidation of the
vaguely construed Michigan residency provision. If any doubt exists
regarding the scope of Louisiana in due process cases, absent evidence of discriminatory purpose or application, the rationales underlying a broad range of settled case law suggest that vague statutes
touching upon voting rights violate the due process clause. This position is supported by the general legal proscriptions against unfettered
discretion, and by the special significance and protections that attach
when voting rights are in issue. Finally, it is difficult to imagine any
competing state policies that would compel a contrary result in
Wilkins. Little can be said for any policy that unnecessarily fosters
unfettered discretion. In fact, it seems to be in a state's best interest
to define accurately the class to which legislation applies, and to
establish specific standards by which administrative officials may
reliably determine which individuals are members of the defined
class.
The impact of the Wilkins due process holding upon the Michigan student residency provision is perhaps not as devastating as might
105. 225 F. Supp. at 384 (emphasis added). This passage was cited in part by the
Supreme Court. 380 U.S. at 152.
106. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
107. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 n.4, 159-64 (1969).
See generally Blasi, supra note 88, at 1534-50; Monaghan, First Amendment "Due
Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970).
108. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 162-63 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
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first appear. The Michigan supreme court commented that "if this
[due process violation] were the only infirmity of the statute, we
could correct this defect by issuing guidelines consistent with the
Constitution."109 There is authority for judicial "saving" of a vague
statute by construction.110 Moreover, even if a judicial "saving construction" would have been improper in Wilkins,111 the legislature
might have re-enacted a similar provision including standards for
registrars sufficient to ·withstand due process attack. In short, the
due process holding standing alone proscribes only the discretionary
manner of administrative action.
In light of the subsequent equal protection holding invalidating
the statutory provision, the Michigan supreme court refrained from
issuing guidelines for registrars to cure the discretion.112 That equal
protection holding is potentially of more far-reaching consequence
than the finding of a constitutionally prohibited unfettered discretion in the registrars.
IV.

A.

EQUAL PROTECTION

The Applicable Equal Protection Standard

As the starting point for its equal protection analysis, the Michigan supreme court faced the problem of determining the equal protection standard applicable in reviewing the constitutionality of the
student residency provision.113 Most statutory classifications, such as
those affecting economic rights, have been upheld under the equal
protection clause where it is shown that the legislature had a reasonable basis for the classification, or, in other words, where the classification was not purely arbitrary.114 On the other hand, in several types
109. 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W.2d 427.
110. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1969);
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-77 (1941). See also Freund, supra note 58, at
540-41:
Can an overbroad statute be saved by construction? If the limiting construction
is a relatively simple and natural one it can probably be made to save the statute.
A law requiring street parades to be licensed, but containing no standards to
govern the grant of a license, appears to be invalid on its face, and yet when the
highest court of the state interpreted it to condition the grant or refusal of a
license only on the basis of safety and convenience of traffic, the Supreme Court
accepted the limitation and sustained a conviction.
(Emphasis added.)
111. When a "saving construction" would involve the promulgation of complex and
lengthy standards in a setting of ambiguous legislative intent, it is arguable that
court-made standards are insufficient and that legislative criteria are necessary.
112. 385 Mich. at 679, 189 N.W.2d at 427.
113. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 168.ll(b) (1967), set forth in note 17 supra,
114. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-29 (1961); Allied Stores of
Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949); Gossaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See generally Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1077-87 (1969).
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of cases the Supreme Court has ruled that a more stringent review
of legislative classification is applicable, requiring a higher degree of
justification for the classification.115
The first group of cases invoking this higher standard of review
have been those in which the classification is "suspect" because of the
nature of the group of persons singled out for different treatment.
Thus, when classifications are based on race,116 alienage,117 or nationality118 a heavy burden of justification must be met.119 In order to
show this justification "[the classification] must be sho·wn to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective."120
Moreover, the Court may require that the state's objectives be sufficiently important, relative to the obvious evils of the classification, to
constitute a "legitimate overriding purpose."121
A second group of cases involving the higher standard of justification consist of those in which, without respect to the identity of the
designated class, the classification infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right.122 For example, the Supreme Court in Shapiro v.
Thompson 123 treated the right to travel as fundamental and stated:
[I]n moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any classification
which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to
be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.124
Thus the infringement of a fundamental constitutional right will
invoke the strict equal protection standard commonly referred to as
the "compelling state interest" doctrine.120
In Wilkins, the court focused upon this second group of cases120
115. See Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 1087-1132,
116. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1965); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
117. E.g., Takahishi v. Fish & Grune Commn. 334 U.S. 410 (1948),
118. E.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
119. An unsettled question is whether "wealth" is a "suspect" classification. The
Supreme Court's suggestions have been equivocal. Compare Jaincs v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971), with Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
120. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
121. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
122. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right of interstate travel); Skinner v. Okla•
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right of procreation). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (right of marital privacy).
123. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
124. 394 U.S. at 634 (emphasis added).
125. For a discussion of the "compelling interest" doctrine, see notes 159-66 infra
and accompanying text.
126. Any contention that the compelling interest doctrine should be invoked on the
ground that classification of "students" is suspect would be questionable. There is no
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involving the assertion of a fundamental constitutional right. Justice
Swainson, speaking for the state supreme court, noted that "the right
to vote is one of the most precious, if not the most precious, of all
our constitutional rights." 127 He amply supported this assertion by
reference to relevant statements of the United States Supreme Court:
"Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of
people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right."128
"The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government."129
Moreover, Justice Swainson stated that "[t]he U. S. Supreme
Court has applied the compelling interest test in recent cases involving the right to vote."180 By reference to these cases, including Carrington v. Rash,131 Kramer v. Union Free School District,132 Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 133 City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,134 and Evans v.
Corman,185 the court concluded that the compelling interest test must
be applied to determine whether the student residency requirement
violated the equal protection clause.136
In reaching this result, the court rejected the defendant's contention that the above cases were distinguishable because they involved
"an absolute denial of the right to vote" whereas the Michigan
statute merely involved a "rebuttable presumption against gaining
residence." 187 Comparing the students' predicament to that of litigants in the other cases, the court noted that in several ways the
exclusion of students from the franchise was more absolute than the
denials of voting rights in the allegedly distinguishable cases. For
example, ·with respect to servicemen denied the right to establish
residence and vote in Carrington, the court stated: "All states allow
authority for extending the "suspect classification" doctrine to include "students." See
generally Developments in the Law, supra note 114, at 1087-91, 1124-27.
127. 385 Mich. at 680, 189 N.W.2d at 427.
128. 385 Mich. at 681, 189 N.W.2d at 427-28, quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 17 (1964).
129. 385 Mich. at 681, 189 N.W.2d at 428, quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
555 (1964).
130. 385 Mich. at 681, 189 N.W.2d at 428.
131. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
132. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
133. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
134. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
135. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
136. 385 Mich. at 681, 189 N.W.2d at 428.
137. 385 Mich. at 683, 189 N.W.2d at 428-29.
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servicemen to vote by absentee ballot. In contrast, because of the
various civilian absentee voters' laws, many students would be unable
to register and vote anywhere."138 Moreover, the court reasoned,
Kramer, Cipriano, and Kolodziejski involved statutes denying the
right to vote only in "special elections" (for example, those involving
bond issues and school district elections) and the litigants in those
cases "still could vote for every office from president to local officials. "139 In contrast, some students would be left with no vote in
local elections.140
As an additional reason for rejecting the defendant's contention,
the court apparently found the distinction between an absolute denial of voting rights and a burden on them imposed by a rebuttable
presumption to be irrelevant to whether the compelling interest test
should be applied. The Supreme Court had long noted that "the [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded
modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements
which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race
although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to
race."141 Justice Swainson reasoned that "[t]he Equal Protection
Clause likewise guards against subtle restraints on the right to vote,
as well as outright denial."142 Additionally, the court relied upon
the Supreme Court's concern with burdens on the right to vote, as
expressed in Williams v. Rhodcs,143 wherein the Court stated:
In the present situation the state laws place burdens on two different,
although overlapping, kinds of rights-the right of individuals to
associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of
qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their
votes effectively .... In determining whether the State has power to
place such unequal burdens on minority groups where rights of this
kind are at stake, the decisions of this Court have consistently held
that "only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject
within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms."14 4

Thus the Michigan supreme court concluded that "the fact that a
burden is placed on the right to vote because of the [statutory] rebuttable presumption ... is sufficient to require the State to demonstrate
a compelling interest." 145
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

385 Mich. at 683, 189 N.W.2d at 429.
385 Mich. at 683, 189 N.W.2d at 429.
385 Mich. at 683-84, 189 N.W.2d at 429.
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939).
385 Mich. at 684, 189 N.W.2d at 429.
393 U.S. 23 (1968).
393 U.S. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
385 Mich. at 685, 189 N.W.2d at 429.
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The refutation of the alleged distinction between absolute denial
of the right to vote and a rebuttable presumption affecting voting
rights appears sound, particularly in light of the fact that it was conceded that the effect of the rebuttable presumption on the litigants
was a denial of the right to vote in Ann Arbor.146 Moreover, the State
did not contend that these students could vote elsewhere, even if such
an alternative were assumed relevant.
On the other hand, the court's proposition that a "burden" on
the right to vote invokes the "compelling interest" test needs qualification. The court's assertion rests on sound ground as long as it is
limited to the narrow situation where the magnitude of the "burden"
demonstrably dilutes voting rights, as in Williams, or where it results
in denial of voting rights, as in Wilkins. However the court left unanswered the question of what magnitude of burden is necessary for
invocation of the compelling interest doctrine. Obviously, all burdens on voting rights should not suffice. For example, while a requirement that voter applicants register at the City Hall between specified
hours places some burden on those persons for whom the locale and
timing are inconvenient, surely the court did not intend that its
proposition stretch this far. Moreover, the notion that certain burdens on the right to vote may not invoke the compelling interest test
finds support in a Supreme Court decision holding that the denial of
absentee ballots to prisoners is not a burden sufficient to invoke the
compelling interest doctrine absent an allegation that the right to
vote was denied.147
Taken as a whole, the Court's decisions in the voting rights context demonstrate the utmost concern for and strict scrutiny of all
aspects of the electoral process that may cause a denial or serious dilution of voting rights, including dilution through apportionment,148
limited ballot choice,149 durational residency requirements,150 conclusive bars to residency,1 51 and other qualifications on the right to
vote.152 The protections afforded voting rights could be rendered
meaningless if the states were able to circumvent these protections by
a threshold determination of nonresidency. A decision to apply only
the traditional equal protection test to special residency determinative provisions raises the credible danger that such tests might be
146. 385 Mich. at 674, 185 N.W.2d at 424.
147. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm.rs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969). See also Bullock
v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972).
148. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
149. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
150. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. March 21, 1972).
151. Evans v. Corman, 389 U.S. 419 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
152. E.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (real property ownership);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (leasing or ownership of property or children in schools).
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utilized in efforts to disenfranchise minority groups.11i8 The Court
should apply the compelling interest doctrine to residency-determinative provisions that stand critically at the threshold of the electoral
process.154
Thus, the Michigan supreme court's decision to apply the compelling interest test seems well grounded in both precedent and policy.
In addition, a federal district court has recently followed its lead by
applying the compelling interest test to a similar student residency
provision.155
There can be no doubt that the decision in Wilkins to apply the
"compelling interest" test is of immense significance. Special residency provisions for students are probably valid under the traditional
equal protection test. Since most students do not intend to remain
indefinitely in the locale, special treatment of students does not seem
"wholly arbitrary."156 The fact that others equally transient are not
subject to special provisions is not necessarily a critical flaw in the
statute under this traditional standard, for as stated in Railway Express Agency v. New Y ork,151 "it is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all." 11i8
In sharp contrast, Wilkins illustrates the extreme, and possibly insurmountable, difficulties in justifying special residency provisions for
students under the compelling interest test.

B. Mechanics and Application of the Compelling Interest Test
The scrutiny given a statutory classification under the compelling
state interest doctrine involves the combination of numerous judicial
techniques utilized to test the state's justification for the statutory
classification. First, in contrast to the "traditional" equal protection
standard, the burden of justification rests on the state, and it must
assert the nature of the interests the classification seeks to further. At
this stage the Court may :find that an interest asserted by the state is
"constitutionally impermissible."159 Second, the state must tailor the
153. Cf. text accompanying note 141 supra.
154. An additional argument for application of the compelling interest doctrine
should also be noted. The Court has invoked the compelling interest test where the
fundamental right of travel has been infringed. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394- U.S. 618
(1969). Cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). It could be argued that
a rebuttable presumption against students' residence acts as a deterrent to interstate
travel. The difficult question is whether such a deterrent is a sufficient penalty upon
the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel so as to mandate strict
scrutiny of the provision. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969).
155. Bright v. Baesler, 336 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
156. See text accompanying note 114 supra.
157. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
158. 336 U.S. at 110.
159. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969) (deterring immigration of
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classification so that its application to the designated class is "necessary" to achieve the articulated state interest.160 In finding that
classifications are not "necessary" to the asserted interest, the Court
has utilized at least three distinct techniques: (I) it may place an
evidentiary burden upon the state, requiring evidence that the asserted interest is in fact furthered by the classification; 161 (2) it may
deem that classification unnecessary if alternative "less drastic means"
can be employed to achieve the asserted interest;162 (3) an "exacting
standard of precision" regarding the "coverage" of the statute may be
required-the classification will not be countenanced if it includes a
significant number of persons whose inclusion does not further the
asserted interest while excluding others whose inclusion would have
furthered the asserted interest.163 Finally, even if the classification is
necessary to promote a legitimate state interest, presumably the court
must then determine whether the interest promoted is compelling
when weighed against the countervailing interests infringed upon by
the classification.164
The Michigan student residency provision, as construed to create
a rebuttable presumption against students' residence,165 effected a
classification denying voting rights of the vast majority of students,
who would be unable to rebut the presumption. Since the presumption might have been rebutted by evidence of intent to remain indefinitely in the locale,166 the crux of the equal protection issue is
whether the exclusion from local elections of students who do not
intend to remain indefinitely in the locale is justified by a compelling
state interest.
In Wilkins, the court considered three state interests that the
statutory provision might have promoted: (I) preserving the purity
indigents is constitutionally impermissible purpose); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,
94 (1965) ("fencing out" from the franchise a sector of the population because of the
way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible).
160. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
161. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969): "The argument that
the waiting•period requirement facilitates budget predictability is wholly unfounded.
The records • • • are utterly devoid of evidence that either State or the District of
Columbia in fact uses the one year requirement as a means to predict the number of
people who will require assistance in the budget year."
162. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4276-77 (U.S. March 21, 1972) ("waiting period [for voter registration] is not the least restrictive means necessary for preventing fraud," since six sections of the state code dealt with voting fraud).
163. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969). A useful
terminology that has been suggested in connection with this problem would describe
such a classification as both "underinclusive" and "overinclusive.'' Slightly different
considerations may be raised by classifications that are only "underinclusive" or only
"overinclusive.'' For a full discussion, see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 40, at 344-53.
164. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 n.14 (1969).
165. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
166. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
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of elections;167 (2) excluding students from the franchise because of
fear of the way they may vote; 168 and (3) promoting a concerned and
interested electorate.169 It is worth noting that the cpurt asserted
these interests upon its own initiative because the defendant city
clerk, and the Michigan attorney general, had declined to suggest
any possible compelling interests. 170
1. Purity of Elections (Anti-Fraud)
The Michigan Court of Appeals had held that the student residency provision aids in preserving the purity of elections by ensuring
that students will not vote twice.171 While conceding that the statutory provision might "to some extent aid in this purpose," the Michigan supreme court believed "that [was] not sufficient to justify its
constitutionality."172 The court gave two reasons for this conclusion.
First, it drew upon the authority of United Mine Workers v. Illinois
Bar Association,113 in which the Supreme Court had stated:
"We have therefore repeatedly held that laws which actually affect
the exercise of these vital rights cannot be sustained merely because
they were enacted for the purpose of dealing with some evil within
the State's legislative competence, or even because the laws do in
fact provide a helpful means of dealing with such an evil." 174
In United Mine Workers, the Supreme Court, faced with legislation
infringing first amendment rights of association, 176 applied established balancing techniques in holding that the state's speculative
interest in high standards of legal ethics did not justify the "substantial impairment" of associational rights of mine workers. 170 Implicit
in the Michigan supreme court's reliance on United Mine Worlwrs
is the proposition that the "anti-voting fraud" benefits accruring to
the state from the voter registration provision do not justify a substantial infringement of voting rights.
The second reason given for rejecting the "purity of elections"
167. 385 Mich. at 685-87, 189 N.W.2d at 430.
168. 385 Mich. at 691-93, 189 N.W.2d at 432-34.
169. 385 Mich. at 687-90, 189 N.W.2d at 430-32.
170. See Brief for Appellee at 5, Wilkins v. Bentley, 385 Mich. 670, 189 N,W,2d 423
(1971).
171. 24 Mich. App. 422, 427, 180 N.W.2d 395, 397 {1970).
172. 385 Mich. at 685, 189 N.W.2d at 430.
173. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
174. 385 Mich. at 685-86, 189 N.W.2d at 430, quoting 389 U.S. at 222.
175. At issue was an injunction preventing the union from hiring attorneys on a
salary basis to assist its members on the ground that thls assistance constituted "un•
authorized practice of law." The union had asserted that its members had a first amendment right to legal assistance on a collective basis. See 389 U.S. at 218-21. Cf. Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 {1963).
176. 389 U.S. at 225.
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interest was that the Michigan legislature "ha[d] provided numerous
sanctions which insure the sanctity and purity of elections."177 The
provisions noted by the court178 clearly establish that the registrar
has means to check information given by registrants and that misdemeanor sanctions are available if the registrant has purposely given
incorrect information.179 In light of these less drastic means it is apparent that the asserted interest does not withstand "strict scrutiny."180 On the other hand, the "purity of elections" interest might
raise more difficult questions if the state could show that no alternatives were administratively feasible.

2. "Fencing Out'' Students
The court took judicial notice of a purported state interest in
excluding students from the franchise for fear of the way they may
vote.181 Holding this interest to be "constitutionally impermissible,"
it followed the Supreme Court's unequivocal holding in Carrington:
" 'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because
of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible. '[T]he
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions,' ... cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear
of the political views of a particular group of bona fide residents."182
But, as the language above suggests, Carrington only establishes that
a group of otherwise bona fide residents may not be "fenced out" for
fear of political impact. Thus it does not answer the question
whether students may be "fenced out" because, in connection with
some compelling state interest, independent of fear of political impact, they may permissibly be deemed nonresidents.183
3. Interested and Concer.ned Electorate
The most troublesome of the issues treated by the Michigan supreme court was the question whether promoting a concerned and
interested electorate constitutes a compelling state interest. The court
noted that this same interest was asserted unsuccessfully in Kramer,
177. 385 Mich. at 686, 189 N.W.2d at 430.
178. MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 168.493, .499, .508, .510, .513, .515, .523 (1967);
§§ 168.495, .505 (Supp. 1971).
179. See 385 Mich. at 686-87, 189 N.W.2d at 430.
180. See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
181. 385 Mich. at 691-93, 189 N.W.2d at 432-34.
182. 385 Mich. at 693, 189 N.W.2d at 433, quoting 380 U.S. at 94 (citation omitted).
183. An additional consideration is whether, assuming the existence of such an
independent compelling interest, students may nevertheless attack the statute on
grounds that the "motive" of the legislature was to fence them out for fear of political
impact. The weight of authority suggests that such an attack would be unsuccessful.
See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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Cipriano, Evans, and Kolodziejski, and placed primary reliance upon
the language of Chief Justice Warren in Kramer:
"[I]he classifications must he tailored so that the exclusion of appellant and members of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated
state goal. Section 2012 does not meet the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively distribute the franchise.
The classification in § 2012 permits inclusion of many persons who
have, at best, a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and on
the other hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest
in the school meeting decisions.''184
The Michigan supreme court stressed:
The provisions of MCLA § 168.ll(b) ... in regard to students, like
§ 2012 of the New York laws in Kramer, are not sufficiently drawn

to insure that only voters who are primarily interested are allowed to
vote.•..
Clearly, MCLA § 168.ll(a) ••• (the general voter registration
statute) ·will allow many disinterested persons, by any criteria, to
vote, while MCLA § 168.ll(b), as applied to students, disenfranchises
many interested and concerned citizens.185
Moreover, in support of the proposition that many students are
generally "interested and concerned" citizens, the court drew upon
the standards established by the Supreme Court in Evans 186 and in
Kolodziejski. 181 The court stated:
[W]e see that students have just as many connections with the community as those found by the Supreme Court in Evans and Kolodziejski. Students . • . are included in the census determination of the
state's congressional apportionment.•.. [and] are subject to the
state's laws and regulations. Jury lists are chosen from lists of registered voters. Thus, by denying students the right to register and
vote, they are also denied ... trial by a jury of their peers. Students
pay State income tax, city income tax (if any), gasoline, sales and use
taxes.... As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, property taxes are ultimately paid by renters such as some of the appellants.... Students with children can and do enroll them in the public
school system, and, therefore, have more than a passing interest in
the educational standards of the community.1 BB
Furthermore, the court strengthened its attack on the rationality
of the statutory coverage by pointing out that the statute failed to
184. 385 Mich. at 687, 189 N.W.2d at 430, quoting 395 U.S. at 632.
185. 385 Mich. at 687, 189 N.W.2d at 430, 431.
186. Evans considered the community contacts of residents of the National Institute
of Mental Health, a federal enclave in Maryland.
187. Kolodziejski considered the interest of renters in a bond issue referendum open
only to property owners.
188. 385 Mich. at 688-90, 189 N.W.2d at 431-32,
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establish special provisions for other groups more transient than students.189 In light of its analysis, the court held that students could
not be denied voting rights because of the state's interest in promoting a concerned and interested electorate,190 and that the student residency provision was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause.191

C. An Interested and Concerned Electorate ·Reconsidered;
The Problem of Transients and a Distinction Between Immediate
and Long Run Concern
It is worthwhile to dwell upon the meaning of the Wilkins holding that promoting a concerned and interested electorate does not
justify the provision creating a rebuttable presumption against students' residence. The court's rationale rested upon two defects it
noted in the coverage of the statute. First, the student classification
was overinclusive since it included a significant number of students
who were deemed interested and concerned citizens by the court, and
whose inclusion therefore did not further the asserted interest in a
concerned and interested electorate. Second, the student classification was underinclusive since it did not include other groups more
transient, and presumably more disinterested, than students, and the
inclusion of these groups would have furthered the asserted interest.
These defects go to the rationality and fairness of the classification
and need not suggest any judgment regarding the weight of the state's
interest in a concerned and interested electorate, were it promoted
by a more precisely tailored classification.
The evil of overinclusiveness is obvious as the disenfranchisement
of interested and concerned students does not even further the state's
interest in an interested and concerned electorate. On the other hand
an underinclusive classification might to some extent further the
state's interest. Its defects are more subtle. The underinclusiveness is
differential treatment that seems prima fade contrary to notions of
equal treatment under law. Such differential treatment may sometimes be justifiable,192 but in other cases it can be evidence of discriminatory motives or sloppy drafting by the legislature.
If we accept the premise that students are as interested and concerned as other citizens, then promoting an interested and concerned
electorate is clearly not a compelling state interest justifying the statute, since exclusion of interested and concerned students from the
189. 385 Mich. at 690, 189 N.W.2d at 432. See text accompanying notes 199-201
infra.
190. 385 Mich. at 690, 189 N.W.2d at 432.
191. 385 Mich. at 694, 189 N.W.2d at 434.
192. See notes 220-21 infra and accompanying text. See generally Tussman &: tenBroek, supra note 40, at 344-53.
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franchise in no way furthers the asserted interest. But if the students
are not generally interested in and concerned for the local community, then more difficult problems arise under the compelling interest
test because the state could show that the student residency provision
did substantially promote an interested and concerned electorate.
Thus the nature of students' concern for the community seems a
critical issue.
As a starting point regarding this £actual issue the Court has
suggested that tlie state has the burden under the compelling interest
test of showing that the classification in fact promotes the asserted
interest. 193 Thus the burden of proof was upon Michigan to show
that students were not generally interested and concerned citizens,
and clearly this burden was not met in Wilkins since the state had
declined even to suggest possible compelling interests.194
The Michigan supreme court relied upon students' objective "connections with the community"-for example, payment of taxes and
subjection to local laws-to demonstrate that students were interested
and concerned citizens.195 This argument appears to rest on the assumption that when a person's life is connected with the community
for a period of time sufficient to meet durational residency requirements that person will usually become concerned and interested in
the community out of conscious self-interest and because of unconscious reaction to events surrounding his daily life.
A difficulty in this position is that testing the subjective interest
of a citizen by his objective connections with the community is at
best a rough measure since many persons with substantial objective
ties to the community may in £act be subjectively disinterested. The
use of this objective test may simply reflect judicial opposition to attempted disenfranchisement on the basis of an alleged differential in
interest benv-een classes of citizens when the disenfranchised have
sufficient connections with the community. Such a concern is perhaps
justifiable when applied to the enclave residents in Evans and to the
nonproperty-owning citizens in Kolodziejski. Since different classes
of citizens have different interests, "interest and concern" does not
appear to be a concept readily susceptible of comparison benv-een
classes or even individuals. Moreover, it may be contended that the
grant of suffrage in a democratic society should encourage citizen
interest as well as give voice to those already interested.
Regardless of the justifications for relying upon objective connections with the community to demonstrate the interest of citizens in
Evans and Kolodziejski, the validity of this test is less evident as applied to students since it £ails to focus on the essentially transient
193. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
194-. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
195. See text accompanying note 188 supra.
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nature of most students. In contrast no contention was made in
Evans, Kolodziejski, Cipriano, and Kramer (in which cases an interest
in a concerned and interested electorate was asserted unsuccessfully
by the state)196 that those persons whom the state sought to exclude
from the franchise were transients. Therefore the state might have
contended that even if students' connections with the community
demonstrate immediate interest and concern, students nevertheless
lack a long-run interest and concern for the community.
This distinction between immediate concern and long-run concern is suggested by the implicit recognition in Carrington of the
state's interest in barring transients from the franchise197 and also by
the traditional common-law formulation of residency that requires
an intent to remain indefinitely.198 Nevertheless the validity of the
proposed distinction rests upon an assumption that long-run concern
corresponds to intent to remain indefinitely; and so those who do
not intend to remain indefinitely have a qualitatively inferior concern for the long-run welfare of the community-perhaps because
they will neither reap the benefits nor endure the burdens arising
from decisions with long-run effects. If this assumption were valid,
could the state justify the rebuttable presumption against students'
residence at issue in Wilkins by asserting an interest in promoting an
electorate with long-run concern?
In relation to this state interest, the classification of students is
not overinclusive, as exclusion of most students from the vote would
further the interest in long-run concern if the latter is evidenced by
an intent to remain indefinitely. But as Justice Swainson observed,
the special residency provision applicable to students does not require
other groups equally or more transient than students to meet its provisions. These other groups include operative and kindred workers,
craftsmen, foremen, and some professionals,199 groups representing a
substantial number of persons. Therefore it might be contended that,
the provision is grossly underinclusive in respect to the state's interest
in long-run concern and that such interest is not compelling under
the precise coverage requirement of the compelling interest doctrine.200
On the other hand some workers and professionals, who appear
more transient than students, nevertheless may have initially intended to remain indefinitely in the community, their transience being a consequence of some external event such as loss of a job or
See text accompanying note 184 supra.
See text accompanying notes 213-14 infra.
See text accompanying note 21 supra.
See Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions
Mobile Society, 61 MICH. L. REv. 823, 830 n.10 (1963).
200. See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
196.
197.
198.
199.

-of
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involuntary relocation. Thus these statistical transients may have had
the requisite degree of long-run concern. But what of those workers
and professionals who never intended to remain indefinitely? It
should be noted that the group of workers who move away from the
community as a consequence of initial intent, as opposed to some external event, are not a readily identifiable class within the larger
group of transient workers. It is arguable that the precise coverage
demanded under the compelling interest test201 does not require
inclusion within the classification of persons who are similarly situated in relation to the state's interest but who are not members of a
readily identifiable or ascertainable class.
In support of this contention, commentators have noted that "the
judicial task has really just begun" upon a finding that a classification
is underinclusive or overinclusive.202 Specifically, it has been suggested that an underinclusive classification might be justified by
administrative considerations under some circumstances.208 The
Court has suggested that individuals may not be deprived of fundamental voting righ~ because of some "remote administrative benefit
to the State."204 However, questions with respect to more substantial
administrative problems appear unresolved. Thus, it is possible that
an underinclusive classification might be justifiable even under the
compelling interest test when it can be shmvn that the nonincluded
persons, although similarly situated in relation to the state's interest,
are not members of an identifiable class.
Under this theory, the fact that workers statistically more transient than students are not subject to special residency tests would
not in and of itself be a fatal defect in the student residency provision. Thus a court could reach the question whether the interest in
long-run concern is compelling when weighed against the substantial
infringement of voting rights of excluded students who have immediate concern for the locale. These students are denied the right to a
voice in governmental affairs in the community that is most important to them.
How substantial is the state's competing interest in promoting an
electorate with long-run concern? It might be contended that longrun concern is preservative of stability in local government20 u and is
conducive to responsible voting to the end of long-run welfare of the
community. In this respect the spectre of students irresponsibly floating long-term bond issues and leaving the town "holding the bag" is
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
See Tussman &: tenBroek, supra note 40, at 379.
Id. at 349. .
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
Cf. text accompanying note 12 supra.
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relevant.206 In addition, to the extent that this contention is valid, its
force is magnified by the concentration of students who do not intend
to remain indefinitely in the college locale.
Conversely, many arguments can be mounted in derogation of
the state's interest in long-run concern. First, many persons who do
not intend to remain indefinitely but are not members of an identifiable class are permitted to register and vote, and this suggests that
the interest in long-run concern may not be of drastic import to the
state. Second, students with immediate concern ·will surely be
thoughtful voters, and the interest in long-run concern is only marginal in relation to the broader societal interest in "fair and effective
representation," which the Supreme Court has suggested lies at the
core of our electoral process . 207 Third, assuming that students will
consider the ramifications of their vote upon future students, even
those who do not intend to remain indefinitely may have some longrun concern for the community. In other words, present student
voters as a group may stand in the shoes of future classes of students.
Finally, even if barring students from the franchise promotes the
state's interest in an electorate ·with long-run concern, it seems clear
that such disenfranchisement will tend to negate other vital interests
of the community. Justice Brandeis in a different context noted that
"fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government."208 Similarly, to disenfranchise and thereby
alienate a large ever-present student body closes off legitimate channels through which students might have a voice in their community.
Surely this "repression" is not conducive to the long-run welfare of
the community. Moreover, the inclusion of student voters in local
elections should enhance the democratic process in those communities; as the Court has stated, "Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of the electoral process ...." 209
Thus, it is contended that on balance, the state's interest in promoting an electorate ·with long-run concern is not of compelling
weight in view of the substantial denial of voting rights worked by
the Michigan provision.
A possibility left open by this conclusion, however, is that the
state's interest in long-run concern might be compelling justification
for a special student residency provision if applicable only to special
elections dealing solely with approval of bonds and long-term financing.210 In these situations, the state's interest in long-run concern is
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Cf. text accompanying note

13 supra.

See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion).
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
The Supreme Court has not distinguished between general elections and special
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of greatest force. Moreover, assuming that students could vote in the
election of 'officials whose tenure strongly affected their daily lives, a
limited disenfranchisement, in regard to these special elections, of
those who do not intend to remain indefinitely would work a substantially diminished infringement of students' voting rights. Therefore, a different balance might be struck under the compelling interest test, provided that a court would first find the coverage of the
provision satisfactory despite noninclusion of "unidentifiable" transients. This accommodation of competing interests would have the
advantage of giving students a voice in local government, while
assuaging some of the fears of those who oppose the student vote. 211
On the other hand, the administrative burden of a dual registration
system may be an insurmountable obstacle to this approach.
D.

Conclusion

The holding in Wilkins that the compelling interest test was the
proper equal protection standard for scrutiny of the student residency
provision is supported by the voting rights cases, by reason, and by
policy. Al; to the application of the test, consideration of the state's
interest supports the court's holding that the residency provision is
not justified by a compelling state interest and is therefore in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
It is possible to read Wilkins broadly for the proposition that in
relation to residency and voting "students must be treated the same
as all other registrants."212 Under this view, any residency provision
placing a special burden upon students violates the equal protection
clause. Student residency provisions, however, might well be justified
on several theories. Arguably, a statute placing less burden on students' voting rights than that imposed by the Wilkins provision
might not invoke the compelling interest test, and might be valid
under traditional equal protection notions of rationality and reasonableness. In addition, it is possible that some provisions, particularly
if limited to special purpose elections, might be justifiable under the
compelling interest test provided that the state were able to bolster
its contentions with actual evidence of student disinterest and provided also that a court would tolerate some degree of underinclusiveness if justified by administrative considerations of a substantial
nature. Finally it is worth noting that the Court in Carrington seempurpose elections in cases involving residents who were allegedly "less" interested than
other residents. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v.
City of Houma, 395 U.S. '701 (1969). However, those cases dealt with disenfranchisement
of persons admitted to be bona fide residents, there being no contention that they did
not intend to remain indefinitely.
211. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
212. 385 Mich. at 694, 189 N.W.2d at 434.
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ingly approved in dictum the use by states of special residency tests
for students and others who "present specialized problems in determining residence." 213 While the weight and implications of this
dictum are open to question, 214 it at least remains as a significant
caveat to the Wilkins equal protection result.
In the past decade, the equal protection clause, when interpreted
under the compelling interest test, has come to be perhaps the primary judicial safeguard for individual civil rights and civil liberties.
But Wilkins suggests a problem that arises from the overwhelming
nature of the compelling interest test, wherein lies its greatest
strength and perhaps its greatest weakness. In the voting rights context a paradox arises. On the one hand, the Supreme Court's decisions
safeguarding voting rights seem to mandate the application of the
compelling interest test over statutes affecting all critical stages in the
electoral process.215 On the other hand, the Court has approved some
restrictions on voting rights, such as minimum age requirements,216
and there may be a judicial hesitancy to extend the juggernaut-like
compelling interest test to these requirements for fear that no statute
would withstand scrutiny.
One answer to this problem would be for the Court to find some
reason for not applying the compelling interest test in hard cases217those in which substantial state interests are supported by a statute
that appears to touch upon fundamental rights. 218 But it seems somewhat disingenuous to have the initial determination whether to apply
the compelling interest test tum on the foregone conclusion of the
Court that certain restrictions are justifiable, or vice versa. The
213. 380 U.S. at 95.
214. Can Wilkins be reconciled with this dictum? The implied validity of special
residency provisions for students might be disregarded as unpersuasive since while the
Court's reasoning demonstrated that the conclusive presumption against servicemen's
residence was invalid, it does not suggest any reasons why a rebuttable presumption
against students' residence should be valid. On the other hand, this reconciliation is
not wholly satisfactory since the approval of such tests was arguably not gratuitous in
light of the total problem before the Court-how a state may determine bona fide
residence of servicemen. While students can be distinguished from servicemen on the
ground that they are less transient and not subject to involuntary relocation, the
analogy is perhaps too close to be lightly dismissed. In essence, this latter view seems
in direct conflict with Wilkins. Although the cases can be reconciled on the theory that
some student residency provisions, less burdensome than that at issue in Wilkins, are
valid, such a reconciliation would not appear to be within the clear thrust of Carrington. In addition, in footnotes the Court suggested that residency tests involving virtually
the equivalent of the Michigan rebuttable presumption were examples of "reasonable
and adequate steps" which states could take to determine residence of students and
others presenting special residency problems. 380 U.S. at 91-93 n.3, 96 n.6.
215. See text accompanying notes 127-36, 148-54 supra.
216. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Cf. note 221 infra.
217. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
218. For example, it is possible that the Supreme Court might decline application
of the compelling interest test if called upon to review eighteen-year old minimum age
requirements for voting. See note 221 infra.
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critical need, therefore, is for the development of judicial standards
that would more clearly delineate when the compelling interest test
should be invoked and what limitations exist of necessity on the
doctrine's application under specific categorical circumstances.
Perhaps the most troubling difficulties under the compelling interest test arise in connection with the requirement of an "exacting
standard of precision" of the classification in relation to the state's
interests.219 Does this requirement preclude a classification that does
not include all persons similarly situated with respect to the state's
interest when the underinclusiveness of the statute may be necessitated by the fact that those persons not included are not part of a
readily identifiable group?220 "What if a classification must of necessity be both overinclusive and underinclusive if the state is to promote a substantial interest?221 In the final analysis, the compelling
interest doctrine will retain its vitality only through the careful doctrinal development of such "necessity" limitations on its requirements, rather than through the more expedient path of a threshold
determination to apply the traditional equal protection standard in
difficult cases.
219. See note 163 supra and accompanying text.
220. See text accompanying notes 199-204 supra.
221. Justice Stewart has commented:
[There has been no suggestion] that the States have anything but a constitutionally
unimpeachable interest in establishing some age qualification as such. Yet to test
the power to establish an age qualification by the "compelling interest" standard
is really to deny a State any choice at all, because no State could demonstrate a
"compelling interest" in drawing the line with respect to age at one point rather
than another.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 294 (1970). This contention seems true under a rigid
application of the compelling interest test requirement of an "exacting standard of
precision." See text accompanying note 163 supra. For example, assuming an interest
in a mature electorate asserted in justification of even an eighteen-year old minimum
age requirement, many seventeen-year olds might have the desired maturity while
many nineteen-year olds might not. Clearly, however, drawing the line somewhere is
"necessary" to the state's interest.

